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This  article  discusses  measurement  of  socioeconomic  inequalities  in  the  prevalence  of a health  condition,
in response  to the  recent  exchange  between  Guido  Erreygers  and  Adam  Wagstaff,  in  which  they  discuss
the merits  of  their own  corrections  to the  frequently  used  concentration  index.  We  ﬁrst  reconcile  their
debate  and discuss  the  value  judgments  implicit  in  their  indices.  Next,  we  provide  a formal  deﬁnition  of
the previously  undeﬁned  value  judgment  in Wagstaff’s  correction.  Finally,  we  show  empirically  that  the
choice  of index  matters,  as  illustrated  by  comparisons  between  countries  using  data  from  the  European
Survey  of  Health,  Ageing  and  Retirement.63
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. Introduction
Since the 1990s, the concentration index approach has been
he standard tool in health economics for evaluating socioecono-
ic  inequalities in health. Because the concentration index (C) is
erived from the Gini coefﬁcient of income inequalities, it requires
he health variable to be on the same scale as income, i.e. on a
atio-scaled measure without an upper bound (Erreygers, 2009a).
s health differs from income in several aspects, such a variable is
arely at hand. Instead, health measures tend to be bounded and
ither ordinal or cardinal.
For bounded variables, (1) C may  rank countries by inequali-
ies in health and ill-health differently (Clarke et al., 2002), (2) the
aximum and minimum value of C depend on the mean health in
he society (Wagstaff, 2005), and (3) the value of C depends on the
cale of the health variable (Erreygers, 2009a).  To account for these
ssues, Erreygers (2009a) and Wagstaff (2005) have each developed
heir own corrections of C for bounded variables.The merits and value judgments of these indices have been
ntensely debated (Erreygers, 2009a,b; Erreygers and Van Ourti,
011a,b; Wagstaff, 2005, 2009, 2011a,b). Erreygers (2009a,b)
∗ Corresponding author at: Department of Economics, P.O. Box 7082, SE-220 07
und, Sweden. Tel.: +46 46 2227911; fax: +46 46 2224118.
E-mail address: gustav.kjellsson@nek.lu.se (G. Kjellsson).
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Open access under CC BY-NC-ND license.laims that his index is superior because it satisﬁes level indepen-
ence (i.e. an equal increment of health for all individuals does
ot affect the value of the index), while Wagstaff (2009) ques-
ions the desirability of that very property. Although we applaud
rreygers’ quest to extend the concentration index to cardinal vari-
bles, we  argue that Erreygers’ index (E) is not necessarily superior
o Wagstaff’s (W) and the difference between the indices is nor-
ative rather than technical. Although the initial debate mainly
oncerned cardinal variables (Erreygers, 2009a,b; Wagstaff, 2009)
nd Erreygers and Van Ourti (2011a) take a more rigorous approach
o discussing inequality measures for several types of variables,
he latest exchange in Health Economics discusses binary variables
Erreygers and Van Ourti, 2011b; Wagstaff, 2011a,b). This article
econciles, and contributes to, this debate by further examining
he methodological and empirical differences between Erreygers’
nd Wagstaff’s suggested indices, focusing on binary variables.
Speciﬁcally, we formally express the previously undeﬁned value
udgment underlying W.  The importance of further scrutinizing the
mplicit value judgments of the indices is evident as this exercise
laces the conclusions from the recent exchange in a completely
ifferent light. An in-depth discussion of these issues is important
ecause many health variables of empirical interest (e.g. malnutri-
ion, obesity, and a variety of self-assessed measures) are binary
see Hernández-Quevedo et al., 2006; Harper and Lynch, 2007;
an de Poel et al., 2008; Mackenbach et al., 2008), and researchers
nd practitioners may  otherwise use an inequality measure
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ithout considering its implicit value judgments (e.g. Mischra and
oe, 2010; Hernández-Quevedo et al., 2010).
Following Erreygers (2009a,b) and Erreygers and Van Ourti
2011a), we acknowledge that the notion of relative and absolute
alue judgment changes when the health measure is no longer
n unbounded ratio-scaled variable but a binary one. However,
f we interpret the binary variable as a ratio-scaled projection of
revalence on an aggregated level, we may  still use the language
f relative and absolute.
As W,  E, and C all condition absolute inequalities on different
eﬁnitions of the most unequal society,  they capture different per-
pectives on socioeconomic inequalities, and the choice of index
herefore depends on the preferred value judgment. Because E
eights absolute inequalities constantly and independent of the
revalence in the society, it therefore captures an absolute value
udgment. C, however, captures a relative value judgment, and
ince an index cannot measure relative inequality from the per-
pectives of both health and ill-health, the importance of absolute
nequality (and the value judgment) differs depending on the cho-
en perspective; C of health suggests that the same level of absolute
nequality is more severe when the prevalence of health is low,
hile C of ill-health suggests that the inequality is more severe
hen the prevalence of health is high (i.e. when the prevalence of
ll-health is low). As a consequence of the deﬁnition of the most
nequal society, W combines these two perspectives by summing
he magnitude of the relative inequalities in health and in ill-health.
he value judgment underlying W,  which we will refer to as mirror
elativity, suggests (1) that the same level of absolute inequality
s more severe for both high and low values of the prevalence,
nd (2) that inequalities increase (by the same magnitude as rela-
ive inequalities in ill-health) when all individuals’ health increases
roportionally. The formal deﬁnition of this value judgment illus-
rates that it reﬂects both relative inequality in health and relative
nequality in ill-health.
In their latest exchange, Erreygers and Van Ourti (2011b), who
rgue in favor of an absolute index, and Wagstaff (2011b), who
dvocates a relative index, discard W because it is neither an abso-
ute nor a relative index and it therefore behaves counterintuitively.
owever, neither side takes a stand on whether inequalities should
e examined from the perspective of health or ill-health. Instead,
agstaff (2011b) highlights conventions that have arisen for many
ommonly used variables; for example, there are conventions for
sing the fraction of immunized children rather than the fraction
f unimmunized children and for using the fraction of infants dying
efore their ﬁrst birthday rather than the fraction surviving.
The arbitrariness of these conventions is incompatible with bas-
ng the choice of index on a discussion of value judgments; why
hould we adopt totally different value judgments for immuniza-
ion and for child mortality? Unless we have a priori reasons (or
ave at least had a serious discussion of these reasons)1 to adopt
he implicit value judgment of relative inequalities measured in
ither health or ill-health, neither of the relative indices are desir-
ble. We  claim instead that, as the counterintuitive behavior of W
s a consequence of mirror relativity incorporating the two relative
erspectives simultaneously, W represents an ethically defensible
osition and a reasonable alternative to the use of an absolute index
i.e. E) for binary variables.In the next section, we present the methodological background
f measuring health inequalities when the health variable is binary,
nd, as the concentration index approach does not meaningfully
1 Recently, Allanson and Petrie (2012) initiated a discussion of the differences
etween value judgments that underly relative inequality measures of health and
f  ill-health.
E
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easure inequalities in ordinal health variables (Erreygers, 2009a,
. 515), we provide a justiﬁcation for using the concentration index
pproach with binary health measures. In Section 3, we  examine
he value judgments implicit in the indices, formally deﬁne mirror
elativity, and illustrate that the technical advantages of E high-
ighted by Erreygers (2009a,b) are all consequences of the absolute
alue judgment. In Section 4, we  empirically illustrate whether and
hen the choice of index affects comparisons between countries.
hese results conﬁrm that the methodological discussion is truly
mportant, and not just a matter of semantics. In Section 5, we
resent our conclusion and discuss the implications of the concept
f mirror relativity.
. Rank dependent inequality indices
C quantiﬁes relative socioeconomic inequalities in a health vari-
ble, hi, by calculating the cumulative percentage of hi concentrated
n a cumulative percentage of the population ranked by a socio-
conomic variable (cf. Kakwani et al., 1997). C is equal to twice the
rea between the concentration curve and the line of equality (the
5 degree line). The related generalized concentration index (V)
uantiﬁes absolute inequalities and is equal to C multiplied by the
revalence, or mean, of the health variable h (Clarke et al., 2002).
Erreygers (2009a) shows that C, V, W,  and E all belong to the fam-
ly of rank dependent indicators of health inequalities. Following
rreygers, we  express the general form of this family of indicators
s a normalized sum of weighted health levels:
(h) = f (h, n)
∑n
i=1
zihi (1)
here zi = (n + 1)/2 − i, f(h, n) > 0,2 n is the number of individ-
als in a given population, and i denotes the socioeconomic rank
f the individual ranging from the richest (i = 1) to the poorest
i = n). When the health variable is binary, we may  always use the
ector h = (h1, h2, . . .,  hn), which represents the health situation of
he whole population, to construct a vector that represents the ill-
ealth situation of the whole population, deﬁned as shortfalls of
ealth (1 −h) = (1 −h1, 1 − h2, . . .,  1 − hn). Thus, we may  compute
nequality indices of both health and ill-health, i.e. I(h) and I(1 − h).
s zi takes on a positive value if individual i is rich (i.e. from the
pper half of the income distribution) and a negative value if indi-
idual i is poor (i.e. from the lower half of the income distribution),
 positive (negative) value of I(h) suggests a pro-rich (pro-poor)
oncentration of health. Conversely, a positive (negative) value of
(1 − h) suggests a pro-poor (pro-rich) concentration of ill-health.
s the function normalizing the weighted sum f is the only varia-
ion between the indices, it is this that determines the speciﬁc form
nd properties of the indices. We  express C, V, W,  and E for binary
ariables as:
 = f C (h, n)
∑n
i=1
zihi =
2
n2h
∑n
i=1
zihi (2)
 = f V (h, n)
∑n
i=1
zihi =
2
n2
∑n
i=1
zihi (3)
 = f W (h, n)
∑n
zihi =
2 ∑n
zihi (4)
i=1 n (1 − h)h i=1
 = f E(h, n)
∑n
i=1
zihi =
8
n2
∑n
i=1
zihi (5)
2 Compared with Erreygers (2009a), f(h , n, ah , bh) is reduced to f(h , n), as the
ower (ah) and upper (bh) bounds of the binary health variable are equal to 0 and 1,
espectively.
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Table  1
Properties of the rank-dependent indices.
Mirror Transfer Cardinal invariance Level independence
E
√ √ √ √
W
√ √ √
C
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act as constraints to (proportionally) equal transformations in the
health variable. However, asymptotically it is always possible to
deﬁne subgroups in such a way  that marginal changes are feasi-
ble for almost all distributions of hi
∗.7 Nevertheless, one cannot
5 Let I(h∗) = f (h, n)
∑n
i=1zihi , where hi
∗ =
∑kl
i=1+k(l−1)(hi/k),  k is equal to theC satisﬁes cardinal invariance if modiﬁed as C = [2/n2(h − ah)]
∑n
i=1zihi
Erreygers and Van Ourti, 2011a).
oreover, Erreygers (2009a) shows that E is the only indicator
ithin this family that satisﬁes the four properties considered by
rreygers to be desirable:
1) transfer: A small transfer of health from a richer (poorer) to a
poorer (richer) individual translates into a pro-poor (pro-rich)
change in the index.
2) mirror:  The inequality indices of health and ill-health are mirror
images of each other; that is, I(h) is equal to the absolute value
of I(1 − h), but has the opposite sign.
3) level independence:  An equal increment of health for all individ-
uals does not affect the index; that is, the index is invariant to
scalar addition even when the bounds of the variable are kept
constant.
4) cardinal invariance:  A linear transformation of the health vari-
able, hi, does not affect the value of the index; that is, the
measured degree of inequalities is the same, irrespective of
the cardinal scale of the health variable (e.g. I[h] of body tem-
perature would be the same whether measured in Celsius or
Fahrenheit).
As summarized in Table 1, V satisﬁes all but cardinal invariance
nd W satisﬁes all but level independence, while C satisﬁes only
ransfer.3 However, Erreygers and Van Ourti (2011a) show that C
s easily modiﬁed into a cardinal invariant index, which coincides
ith C for binary variables.4 Cardinal invariance is desirable as it
eans that the measured degree of inequality is the same irrespec-
ive of the two numeric values chosen to represent good and bad
ealth (i.e. any dichotomous variable could be used). Unless there is
 strong a priori reason for examining inequalities in the prevalence
f either health or ill-health, the mirror condition is a desirable
roperty when the health variable of interest is binary. The lit-
rature until recently (Allanson and Petrie, 2012) has been mute
egarding such a reason, therefore imposing the mirror condition is
easonable, and W and E are left as the two possible choices (among
he proposed indices). As the desirability of level independence,
hich constitutes the main difference between the two  indices,
s closely related to the value judgment inherent in the index, our
urther discussion below therefore focuses on the underlying value
udgments in E and W.  In order to illustrate the differences in the
alue judgment, we also continue to refer to V, C(h), and C(1 − h).
.1. A justiﬁcation for binary variablesA binary variable is a speciﬁc representation of an ordinal or
ualitative dichotomous variable. As such a scale is not usable with
3 As the normalization functions of W and E, respectively, in gen-
ral are equal to fE(h , n, ah , bh) = 8/(n2[bh − ah]) and fW(h , n, ah ,
h) = (2[bh − ah])/(n2[bh − h][h − ah]), E = 4V holds for binary variables, but
ot in general, and W and E are invariant to any cardinal scaling of h (while C and V
re not).
4 The modiﬁed C = [2/n2(h − ah)]
∑n
i=1zihi , where ah is the lower bound of the
ealth variable.
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ank dependent indices (Erreygers, 2009a; Erreygers and Van Ourti,
011a), another interpretation of the variable is needed.
Although an arbitrary dichotomous variable is at most ordinal,
he binary representation has an absolute interpretation. The zero
alue of a binary variable, such as prevalence of any health condi-
ion, corresponds to a situation of complete absence, that is, zero
ndicates that the individual is not in the relevant health condition
cf. Roberts, 1979, pp. 64–65). Thus, the binary representation is
ompatible with the cumulative nature of C, as the successive addi-
ion of the “zeroes and ones” can intuitively be interpreted as the
umulative number of healthy or unhealthy individuals concen-
rated within a cumulative proportion of the population. Related
o this understanding, one could consider the binary variable as
rojected onto a ratio-scaled measure of health bounded at 0 and
 (hi
∗) by using the prevalence at an aggregated level of deﬁned
ubgroups (e.g. deciles, percentiles) (cf. Erreygers and Van Ourti,
011a). In fact, any rank-dependent index of hi
∗ is asymptotically
qual to an index of hi.5
Interpreting the binary variable as a ratio-scaled proxy both
acilitates the discussion of relative and absolute inequalities in
ection 3 and provides a more intuitive understanding of level
ndependence for binary variables. Instead of corresponding to
nvariance to a shift of all individuals from 0 to 1 – the only possi-
le equal increment of a binary variable – level independence now
orresponds to invariance to equal increments in prevalence across
he quantiles.
. Relative and absolute value judgments
For unbounded ratio-scaled variables, the notion of relative
nd absolute value judgments is clear-cut. Being invariant to an
qual health increment but not to an equiproportionate change in
he health variable is equivalent to being a measure of absolute
nequalities (e.g. V). The opposite applies for measures of relative
nequalities (e.g. C). It is clear from the discussion in Erreygers
2009a,b) and Wagstaff (2009) that it is not as straightforward for
ounded health variables.
Although using hi
∗ facilitates the discussion of relative and
bsolute inequalities, it does not address the issues induced by
he bounds of the health variable. First, an increase in health is
irrored by a decrease in ill-health. Second, an equiproportion-
te change in health does not translate into an equiproportionate
hange in ill-health; as the health of everyone increases equipro-
ortionately, the decrease in ill-health is smaller (in both absolute
nd relative terms) among the less healthy.6 Third, the bounds mayumber of observations in each subgroup, and l is the index of the subgroup. Then
(h*) will converge to I(h) when either the number of observations or the number
f  groups increases. Increasing the number of groups is analogous to decreasing the
umber of observations within the group toward one. We  are thankful to Guido
rreygers and Tom Van Ourti for comments on this speciﬁc issue.
6 In fact, an equiproportionate increase in health is translated into an equipro-
ortionate decrease and an equal increment of ill-health. For example, let
i  ˇ = hi(1 + ı) = hi + hiı, and let the shortfalls (1 − hi) = si then hiı = (1 − si)ı = ı − siı.
hus, to both satisfy the mirror condition and remain invariant to equiproportionate
hanges, an index also has to be insensitive to equal increments (level independence).
7 Erreygers and Van Ourti (2011a) address this issue by redeﬁning the concepts of
elative and absolute to quasi-relative and quasi-absolute. Although we acknowl-
dge the differences, we  will in this paper still refer to these value judgments as
bsolute and relative.
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the total amount of health is low and the few healthy individuals are
mostly concentrated in the richest percentiles to be more unequal
than a society where the total amount of health is high and the few62 G. Kjellsson, U.-G. Gerdtham / Journa
irectly translate the relative and absolute value judgments from
nbounded variables to bounded ones.
The ﬁrst two points suggest that unless the mirror condition
s relaxed, an index of a bounded variable cannot be a pure mea-
ure of relative inequalities; such an index will always be sensitive
o equiproportionate changes of health, and the response to equal
ncrements will not be negative for all values of h. While Erreygers
nd Van Ourti (2011a) therefore argue in favor of an absolute value
udgment and Wagstaff (2011b) advocates relaxing the mirror con-
ition, we present an alternative view.
The following sections reveal the underlying value judgment of
he examined indices by exploring how, and why, equiproportion-
te changes and equal increments affect the indices. Above all, we
rovide a formal deﬁnition of the underlying value judgment of W.
owever, to understand these value judgments and the response
f the indices, we ﬁrst need to discuss how the indices deﬁne – and
iffer in their deﬁnition of – the most unequal society.
.1. The most unequal society
C, W,  and E all answer the question of how far a society is from
he most unequal society by conditioning the level of actual abso-
ute inequality on the absolute inequality in such a state. However,
he deﬁnition of this state varies between the three indices.
To visualize the differences between W,  E, and C, it is useful to
xpress the indices in terms of a ratio between V of the observed
tate (i.e. actual level of absolute inequality) and V of the most
nequal society according to the deﬁnition of the respective index
Vmax I, where I refers to the speciﬁc index E, W,  or C). As V is equal to
wice the area between the line of equality and the generalized con-
entration curve – the cumulative population graphed against the
umulative amount of mean health h – the numerator is always
qual to area I + II in Fig. 1. The denominators reﬂect the indices’
espective deﬁnitions of the most unequal society (see Appendix
1). According to C, the most unequal society is a state where all
ealth is concentrated in the richest individual (i.e. Vmax C equals
rea I + II + III + IV + VI).
For a binary variable, such a state is not feasible unless there
s only one unit of health to distribute within the population (i.e.
nly one individual is healthy). Wagstaff (2005) addresses exactly
his issue when he normalizes C by 1/(1 − h) (compare Eqs. (2)
nd (3)). Thus, in the most unequal society according to W,  only
he richest proportion of individuals is in good health, where this
roportion always equals h (i.e. Vmax W equals area I + II + III + IV).
s both the lower left and the upper left corners of the area change
ith h, the size of the denominator will depend on h. Conversely,
he society on which E conditions is independent of the prevalence
n the society, and always corresponds to the richest 50% of indi-
iduals being in good health (i.e. Vmax E equals area I + III + V). The
onstant denominator of E corresponds to level independence. The
enominators, and thus the values, of E and W coincide only when
h = 0.5. As the deﬁnition of the most unequal society drives the
ifferences between the two indices, it is crucial to keep the deﬁ-
itions in mind when evaluating the properties and the underlying
alue judgments of the indices.
.2. The effect on indices of equal increments
Because V, a measure of absolute inequality and the numera-
or of E, W,  and C, is insensitive to equal increments of health,
he response of the indices to equal increments depends only
n the response of the denominator. Evaluating the response of
he denominator is equivalent to evaluating the derivative of the
ormalization function in Eqs. (1)–(5) with respect to h (i.e.
f[h, n]/∂h). The constant denominator (i.e. ∂fE[h, n]/∂h = 0)
o
2alth Economics 32 (2013) 659– 670
onﬁrms that E satisﬁes level independence and is insensitive to
qual increments of prevalence across the quantiles – exactly as
xpected for an absolute index.8
As W satisﬁes the mirror condition, it cannot be a pure measure
f relative inequality. In contrast to C’s unambiguously negative
esponse to equal increments, W decreases for h < ½ and increases
or h > ½; i.e. ∂fC(h)(h, n)/∂h < 0; ∂fW(h, n)/∂h < 0 for h < ½
nd > 0 for h > ½.9 The translation of an equal increment in health
o an increase in the index, despite the decrease in relative health
ifferences, is the opposite of what is expected from a relative
nequality index. This counterintuitive behavior occurs because
revalence is a bounded variable, and when health increases from,
or example, 0.7 to 0.8, there is a simultaneous decrease in ill-health
n the same variable from 0.3 to 0.2. Imposing the mirror condition
mplies that the response to changes in health must equal the abso-
ute value of the response to changes in ill-health, but with opposite
ign. Consequently, the marginal response of W to an equal incre-
ent, ∂fW(h, n)/∂h, for h < ½ is the negative mirror of the same
unction for h > ½. Rewriting the normalization function of W,
W(h, n), as the sum of the normalization function of C(h) and
(1 − h), i.e. the sum of fC(h)(h, n) and fC(1−h)(1 − h, n):
W (h, n) =
2
n2(1 − h)h
= 2
n2h
+ 2
n2(1 − h)
= f C(h)(h, n) + f C(1−h)(1 − h, n) (6)
mplies that the marginal response of W equals the sum of the
arginal response, with respect to health,  of C(h) and C(1 −h):
∂f W (h, n)
∂h
= (4h − 2)
n2(h − 2h)
2
= − 2
n22
h
+ 2
n2(1 − h)2
= ∂f
C(h)(h, n)
∂h
+ ∂f
C(1−h)(1 − h, n)
∂h
(7)
hus, the change in the degree of inequality due to an equal incre-
ent in health equals the sum of the changes in relative inequality
n health, C(h), and relative inequality in ill-health C(1 − h). Eq. (7)
lso reveals that the marginal response of W always has the same
ign as (and a similar shape to) the marginal response of the C that
epresents the variable, health or ill-health, with the lowest mean
nd largest change in inequality. That is, if h < 1/2 then |∂fC(h)(h,
)/∂h| > |∂fC(1−h)(1 − h, n)/∂h|, and ∂fW(h, n)/∂h has the same
ign as ∂fC(h)(h, n)/∂h, and vice versa.
Fig. 2 further demonstrates this relationship and the underlying
alue judgments of the indices by graphing the weights of abso-
ute inequalities – the normalization function f or equivalently the
nverse of the most unequal society 1/Vmax I (see Appendix A1) –
s a function of h for W,  E, C(h), and C(1 − h). The weight of C(h)
uggests that the severity of a given level of absolute inequality
ises at an increasing rate as the total amount of health in the pop-
lation falls, while the weight of C(1 − h) suggests the opposite,
hat the severity rises increasingly as the total amount of health
ises. Thus, with a certain level of absolute inequality and a neg-
tive relationship between health and socioeconomic status (as is
ommonly the case), using C(h) or C(1 − h) implies two opposing
ositions. C(h) represents a position that considers a society where8 Level independence corresponds to Erreygers and Van Ourti’s (2011a) deﬁnition
f  a quasi-absolute measure for bounded variables.
9 ∂f C(h)(h, n)/∂h = −2/(n22h) < 0; ∂f W (h, n)/∂h = (4h −
)/(n2(h − 2h)
2
) = 0 if h = 0; >0 for h > ½; <0 for h < ½;
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Fig. 1. The most unequal society. Note: If the health variable is ill-health rather than health, then the deﬁnition of the most unequal society is reversed; that is, the ill-health
is  concentrated in the richest individual (C), the richest share of the individuals are in bad health (W), and the richest 50% of the individuals are in bad health (E). However, the
area  representing these reversed inequalities is as large as the area between the line of eq
poorest individuals are in bad health. As these areas would be above the line of equality, u
on  the absolute value of Vmax I.
Fig. 2. f or 1/Vmax I of W,  E, C(h), and C(1 − h). Note: The functions are shown for
any arbitrary value of n. ∂fW(h , n)/∂h (the derivative of black line) has the same
sign (negative) as ∂fC(1−h)(1 − h , n)/∂h (the derivative of dash) as long as h < 1/2,
whereas for h > 1/2, ∂fW(h , n)/∂h has the same sign (positive) as ∂fC(h)(h , n)/∂h
(the derivative of dash-dot).
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(remember that the interpretation of the sign of I[1 − h] is the
reverse of I[h]). Thus, by incorporating the two relative perspectives
in the same index, W takes into account that the change in ill-health
11 I(ˇh∗) = f ( ˇ, n)
∑n
z ˇh ∗ = f ( ˇ, n)ˇ
∑n
z h ∗ = ˇf ( , n)
∑n
z h ∗ =ick (unhealthy) individuals are mostly concentrated in the poorest
ercentiles. C(1 − h) represents the opposite position. By weight-
ng the degree of absolute inequality by the sum of fC(h)(h, n) and
C(1−h)(1 − h, n) (i.e. a strictly convex function that is symmetric
round 0.5),10 W combines the two perspectives, suggesting that
he same level of absolute inequality is more severe for extreme val-
es of the prevalence, that is, either high or low. As W reﬂects the
erspective – health or ill-health – with the lowest prevalence (and
he highest level of relative inequality) the behavior may  not be
s counterintuitive as it ﬁrst appears (compare Erreygers and Van
urti, 2011a).  We  develop and formalize this argument after dis-
ussing the response of the indices to equiproportionate changes
n health in the following section.10 That is, ∂2f W (h, n)/∂h2 = (4(32h − 3h + 1))/(n2(h − 2h)
3
) > 0 for
 < h < 1.
ˇ
o
t
ouality and the imaginary line of perfect inequality, representing a state where the
sing such a deﬁnition would require that the absolute inequalities are conditioned
.3. Linearity and the effect on indices of equiproportionate
hanges
In line with what is expected from an absolute index, E increases
s a response to an equiproportionate increase in health (note that
hen evaluating the response to an equiproportionate change in
ealth, we  need to consider the ratio-scaled projection of h, i.e. h*).
rreygers (2009b) further highlights the linearity of E.
Linearity: A reduction of every individual’s health from hi
∗ to
hi
∗, where 0 ≤  ˇ < 1, implies that ˇI(h*) = I(ˇh*).
A rank-dependent index satisﬁes linearity only if it is level
ndependent.11 Provided that the transformation is feasible, lin-
arity also means that if the prevalence is doubled in every decile,
he measured degree of inequality is doubled as well. Because the
umerator of the indices in Fig. 1 (absolute inequalities) satisﬁes
inearity, E satisﬁes this property with its constant denominator.
W’s  response is more complex than both the easily interpreted
inearity of E and the invariance of C(h*). An increase in health from
* to ˇh* implies that V increases by ˇ, while the denominator of
, Vmax W, increases by less than ˇ, and thus W increases as the
ociety moves further away from the most unequal state. In fact,
he response of W is increasingly positive in ˇ, i.e. ∂W(ˇh*)/∂  ˇ > 0;
2W(ˇh*)/∂ˇ2 > 0. Rewriting W as:
(h) = 1
(1 − h)h
V(h) =
(
1
h
+ 1
(1 + h)
)
V(h)
= C(h) − C(1 − h), (8)
hows that W equals the sum of the measures of relative inequal-
ty in health and ill-health12 and illustrates that the increase of
nequality according to W is always of the same magnitude as the
ncrease according to C(1 − h*), i.e. ∂W(ˇh*)/∂  ˇ = −∂C(1 − ˇh*)/∂ˇh i=1 i i h i=1 i i h i=1 i i
I(h∗) if and only if f (hˇ, n) = f (h, n), which is equivalent to level independence
r ∂f(h , n)/∂h = 0.
12 Observe that the varying part of the normalization function (i.e. the inverse of
he  most unequal society) of W is both the product and the sum of the varying part
f  the normalization function of C(h) and C(1 − h).
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hat mirrors the equiproportional change in health becomes more
isproportional as  ˇ increases. That is, while the relative inequal-
ty in h is constant, the relative inequality in (1 − h) accelerates.
owever, as the part of W that reﬂects relative inequality in h is
naffected, the relative change in W(h*) is still smaller than the
elative change in C(1 − h*):
C(1 − ˇh∗)
C(1 − h∗) =
V(1 − ˇh∗)/(1 − ˇh)
V(1 − h∗)/(1 − h)
= ˇ (1 − h)
(1 − ˇh)
>
(1 − h)
(1 − ˇh)
= W(ˇh
∗)
W(h∗)
ifˇ > 1 (9)
In the next section, we  further develop this argument and for-
ally deﬁne the value judgment that underlies W.
.4. Mirror relativity
The last two sections suggest that by normalizing C to the most
nequal society possible (given the prevalence), W takes both rel-
tive inequality in health and relative inequality in ill-health into
ccount in one and the same index. To simultaneously consider
he health and ill-health distributions in one index that satisﬁes
he mirror condition, without necessarily reverting to a measure
f absolute inequality, is in line with the framework suggested
n a recent paper by Lasso de la Vega and Aristondo (2012).13
ne way of combining the two relative value judgments is a lin-
ar combination of the two relative indices, C(h) and C(1 − h), i.e.
(h) = aC(h) + bC(1 − h), where a and b are constants. Imposing the
irror condition further implies that a = −b must hold.14 Since the
nterpretation of the sign of C(1 − h) is the reverse of C(h), such an
ndex sums the magnitude of relative inequality in health and the
agnitude of relative inequality in ill-health into one index. We
efer to this normative attribute as mirror relativity.
Mirror relativity: I(h) is mirror relative index if
(h) = B[C(h) − C(1 − h)] (10)
here B is a positive constant.
The class of mirror relative index consists only of multiples of
.15 Mirror relativity implies that (1) inequality in health increases
y the same magnitude as relative inequality in ill-health, i.e.
ny scalar multiple of C(1 − h), when the health of everyone
ncreases proportionally, and (2) the degree of absolute inequal-
ty is weighted by a U-shaped function (a strictly convex function
ymmetric around 0.5).
roposition 1. A rank dependent index I(h) is mirror relative if and
nly if
1) For an equiproportionate change in health from h* to ˇh*,
I(h*) changes by the same magnitude as a rank-dependent
index that is relative from the perspective of ill-health, i.e.
13 Lasso de la Vega and Aristondo (2012) propose a uniﬁed framework where the
chievement and the shortfall distributions can be jointly analyzed, without restric-
ing the indices to an absolute value judgment. Although their framework considers
nivariate indices, it is easily transferable to the family of bivariate rank-dependent
ndices. Thus, our argument in favor of mirror relativity follows in the line of their
easoning and the class of mirror relative indices (corresponding to a scalar mul-
iple of the arithmetic mean of C[h] and −C[1 − h]) is a special case (r = 1) of their
uggested r-indicators translated to the Concentration Index.
14 Let I(h) = aC(h) + bC(1 − h), where a and b are constants (f(h , n) > 0 further
equires a > 0 and b < 0), satisfy the mirror condition, i.e. I(h) = −I(1 −h). Rewriting
(h) = aC(h) + bC(1 − h) = −(aC(1 − h) + bC(h)) = −I(1 − h), as [aV(h)/(h) − bV(1 −
)/(1 − h)] = [aV(1 − h)/(1 − h) − bV(h)/h] implies aV(h)/h(1 − h) =
[bV(h)/h(1 − h)], which reduces to a = (−b).
15 W (i.e. B = 1) is the only index in this class that is bounded between 0 and 1.
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∂I(ˇh∗)
∂ˇ
= −
∂
(
A
(1−ˇh)
∑n
i=1zi(1−ˇhi
∗)
)
∂ˇ
for all admissible ˇ, where A
is a positive constant.
2) The normalization function f is a strictly convex function in h and
symmetric around h = 0.5.
roof. Proof in Appendix A2.
Thus, mirror relativity reﬂects the disproportionality of the
ecrease in ill-health that occurs when the health of everyone
ncreases proportionally. The larger the increase in health, the
ore disproportional the change in ill-health. Mirror relativity
lso reﬂects the fact that for an equal increment of health that
eaves all absolute differences the same, relative inequality in
ealth increases while relative inequality in ill-health decreases.
 mirror-relative index decreases as long as the decrease in rela-
ive inequality in health exceeds the increase in relative inequality
n ill-health.
As this value judgment cannot be expressed by a simple equiv-
lence criterion (as an absolute or relative value judgment), we
ill use the elasticity of the normalization function (or the most
nequal society),
(h) =
∂f (h, n)
∂h
h
f (h, n)
(11)
o further relate mirror relativity to the commonly known value
udgments. Erreygers and Van Ourti (2011a) use ε(h) to develop
easures of an index’s sensitivity to relative and absolute inequal-
ty in order to deﬁne different classes of indices. They deﬁne the
eight an index gives to relative inequality as −ε(h) and the
eight it gives to absolute inequality as 1 + ε(h). Thus, indices for
hich −ε(h) = 1 are deﬁned as relative, i.e. ε(h) = −1; indices for
hich 1 + ε(h) = 1 are deﬁned as absolute, i.e. ε(h) = 0; indices for
hich both weights are positive are called mixed inequality indices,
.e. −1 < ε(h) < 0; and indices for which the relative inequality
eight is negative and the absolute inequality weight is greater
han 1 are called inverse-relative indices, i.e. ε(h) > 0. An inverse-
elative index increases in magnitude for an equal increment,
lthough that also means that all relative differences decrease. For
xample, an index that is relative from the perspective of ill-health,
.e. any multiple of C(1 − h), is inverse-relative from the perspective
f health. To show this property we introduce a similar but modi-
ed elasticity concept; the elasticity of the normalization function
ith respect to the inverse perspective (1 − h).
(1 − h) =
∂f (h, n)
∂(1 − h)
(1 − h)
f (h, n)
(12)
To obtain the weight C(1 −h) puts on absolute inequalities
nd relative inequalities in health, let (h) replace ε(h) in the
eﬁnitions above. As the elasticity of the normalization func-
ion of C(1 − h) with respect to h equals C(1−h)(h) = [∂f(1 − h,
)/h][h/f(1 − h, n)] = h/(1 − h) and C(1−h)(h) > 0 holds for all
h, C(1 − h) is inverse relative from the perspective of health.
The elasticity of the normalization function of W (or any mir-
or relative index) equals εW(h) = (2 h − 1)/(1 − h) and implies
hat W is a mixed inequality index for h < 0.5 and an inverse-
elative index for h > 0.5. Thus, inverse-relativity is the formal
eﬁnition of the counterintuitive behavior that we  previously dis-
ussed. Rewriting the elasticity of W as the sum of εC(h)(h) and
C(1−h)(h) (i.e. the elasticities with respect to health of C[h] and
[1 − h]) illustrates the notion of mirror relativity; a mirror rela-
ive index is a compromise that takes into account, and is bounded
etween, the two relative value judgment.
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relative inequalities in health), εW(h) approaches εC(h)(h) = −1
(i.e. as the relative inequalities in ill-health converge to zero, W
only considers relative inequalities in health).G. Kjellsson, U.-G. Gerdtham / Journa
roposition 2. A rank dependent index I(h) is mirror relative if and
nly if:
(h) =
2h − 1
1 − h
= −1 + h
1 − h
= εC(h)(h) + C(1−h)(h) (13)
hat is, the elasticity of the normalization function equals the sum of
he elasticities, with respect to h, of the normalization functions for
(h) and C(1  − h).
roof. Proof in Appendix A2.
Thus, the weight a mirror relative index puts on relative inequal-
ties in health (i.e. −ε[h]) equals the sum of the weights that C(h)
nd C(1 − h) puts on relative inequalities in health.  The elasticity
ormula in Eq. (13) illustrates that the larger the h, the larger
he inﬂuence from relative inequalities in ill-health in relation to
he inﬂuence from relative inequalities in health and vice versa. As
h tends to one of its bounds, the value judgment a mirror rela-
ive index embodies tends to one of the two relative judgments.
q. (13) further illustrates that the mentioned counterintuitive
ehavior is a consequence of W taking both relative perspectives
nto account. As the ﬁrst part of Eq. (13) equals εC(h)(h) = −1 (i.e.
elative inequalities in h are unchanged), the (increasingly) posi-
ive response to an equiproportionate change is due solely to the
increasingly) positive second part C(1−h)(h) > 0 (i.e. the relative
nequalities in 1 − h increase). As the inﬂuence of relative inequal-
ties in ill-health exceeds the inﬂuence of relative inequalities in
ealth (i.e. C[1−h][h] > −εC[h][h]) for h > 1/2, a mirror relative
ndex is inverse-relative for this span.
At ﬁrst sight it may  seem difﬁcult to argue in favor of an inverse-
elative index (compare Erreygers and Van Ourti, 2011a).  However,
or binary variables inequalities may  be evaluated from both the
erspective of health and the perspective of ill-health. Although
(h) is relative from the perspective of health, it is by deﬁnition
nverse-relative from the perspective of ill-health and vice versa for
(1 − h). While a mirror relative index is inverse-relative for h > ½
rom the perspective of health, it is mixed from the perspective of
ll-health and vice versa for h < ½.
As noted in the introduction, there is no consensus on the crite-
ia for choosing the perspective from which health inequalities
hould be evaluated, and therefore no clear reason why  we should
pply different relative value judgments to immunization and child
ortality. A position that argues against a mirror relative index
imply because of its inverse-relativity, while at the same time
pproving both of the relative indices equally (i.e. allowing the
rbitrary choice of one or the other), we ﬁnd difﬁcult to support.
nstead, referring to the previous discussion, we  argue that a mir-
or relative index (i.e. W)  is a plausible compromise between the
wo relative perspectives and that such an index is a reasonable
lternative to an absolute index (i.e. E) for binary variables.
.5. Critique against mirror relativity
Erreygers (2009a,b) puts forward two additional properties –
onotonicity and convergence – as arguments for preferring E over
.  E satisﬁes both these properties while W does not. However, the
ollowing section illustrates that these properties are a result of the
eﬁnition of the most unequal society (i.e. the constant Vmax E in
ig. 1) and are only desirable if we want to apply an absolute value
udgment.
.5.1. Individual changes and monotonicity
When considering individual changes in health, level indepen-
ence again constitutes the crucial difference between the indices.
rreygers (2009a) shows that level independence implies mono-
onicity.
a
i
i
aalth Economics 32 (2013) 659– 670 665
Monotonicity: If an individual from the upper half of the income
istribution enters a condition of good health (a pro-rich health
mprovement), then I(h) increases (a pro-rich change).
As the denominator, the most unequal society, of E is constant,
n individual health change modiﬁes only the numerator of the
ndex, and the change in E depends only on the socioeconomic rank
f the individual who is changing health state. As a result, a pro-rich
ealth improvement translates into a pro-rich change in E.
Because W is not level independent, its denominator is not
onstant and it does not satisfy monotonicity; in addition to the
ndividual’s socioeconomic rank, the sign (and size) of the change
n W also depends on the initial prevalence, h, and the initial level
f absolute inequalities (see Appendix A3). Therefore, a pro-rich
ealth improvement does not necessarily translate into a pro-rich
hange in W.
Consequently, Erreygers (2009a, p. 508) criticizes W for pro-
ucing artiﬁcial and counterintuitive results. For example, if the
ichest 10% of a population is in good health, then an additional
ich individual (not ranked in the 11th percentile) entering a state
f good health implies that E increases but W decreases. This health
mprovement is, according to Erreygers, obviously pro-rich but
ranslates into a pro-poor change of W.
However, the non-monotonicity arises from the value judg-
ents underlying W (and C). Most important, the change of the
ealth distribution in the example above is a movement away
rom the most unequal society, as deﬁned by W as a society in
hich only the individuals at the top of the income distribu-
ion are in good health. Likewise, the monotonicity of E arises
rom the deﬁnition of the most unequal society as a society in
hich only the richest 50% of the population is in good health,
ecause in this case an additional individual from the upper
alf of the income distribution entering a state of good health
s always a movement toward such a state. Thus, as Wagstaff
2009) points out, the desirability of monotonicity depends on the
uestion behind the index and the value judgment one wants to
mpose.
.5.2. The convergence property
Erreygers (2009b) states that if the health of every individual is
radually reduced to zero, that is, if the society approaches a state
f perfect equality, then the measured degree of inequality should
lso decrease to zero.
Convergence: If every individual’s health decreases from hi
∗ to
hi
∗, where  ˇ < 1, then I(h*) converges to zero, i.e. limˇ→0I(ˇh∗) = 0.
Any absolute (level independent) rank-dependent index,
ncluding E, satisﬁes this property.16 By contrast, neither a
elative index, which by deﬁnition is invariant to an equipro-
ortional change, nor a mirror relative index converges to
ero. Mirror relativity instead implies a different convergence
oncept, i.e. limˇ→0I(ˇh∗) = C(h∗). That a mirror relative index
onverges to a relative judgment in the lower limit may  be
ntuitively illustrated using the elasticity formula in Eq. (13),
.e. εW(h) = εC(h)(h) + C(1−h)(h). As C(1−h)(h) approaches zero
hen h approaches zero (i.e. C(1 − h) ceases to put any weight on16 In Fig. 1, V = I + II – the absolute inequality or the numerator of the index – gradu-
lly  decreases toward zero as h decreases. As the denominator of E (Vmax E = I + II + V)
s  constant, the ratio will converge to zero. Fig. 1 further illustrates that the denom-
nator of W (I + II + III + IV)  converges to that of C (I + II + III + IV + VI) as area VI
pproaches zero.
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Table 2
Empirical comparison of W and E in 14 countries.
1−h W E Rank W Rank E
Cancer
Austria 0.02 0.30 0.02 1 3
Germany 0.04 −0.18 −0.03 13 14
Sweden 0.07 −0.09 −0.02 10 11
Netherlands 0.03 −0.01 0.00 9 9
Spain 0.02 0.13 0.01 5 4
Italy 0.03 0.24 0.03 2 2
France 0.04 0.20 0.03 3 1
Denmark 0.07 −0.11 −0.03 11 13
Greece 0.01 0.17 0.01 4 5
Switzerland 0.04 0.00 0.00 7 7
Belgium 0.03 −0.19 −0.03 14 12
Czech Rep. 0.05 0.03 0.01 6 6
Poland 0.03 −0.01 0.00 8 8
Ireland 0.05 −0.11 −0.02 12 10
Diabetes
Austria 0.11 0.02 0.01 3 3
Germany 0.15 −0.14 −0.07 13 14
Sweden 0.09 −0.13 −0.04 11 7
Netherlands 0.09 −0.07 −0.02 5 5
Spain 0.15 −0.12 −0.06 8 12
Italy 0.12 −0.04 −0.02 4 4
France 0.10 −0.15 −0.05 14 11
Denmark 0.08 −0.12 −0.04 7 6
Greece 0.13 −0.12 −0.05 6 10
Switzerland 0.06 0.07 0.02 1 2
Belgium 0.10 −0.12 −0.04 9 8
Czech Rep. 0.14 −0.13 −0.06 10 13
Poland 0.11 0.06 0.02 2 1
Ireland 0.10 −0.14 −0.05 12 9
Long-term illness
Austria 0.45 −0.07 −0.06 3 3
Germany 0.59 −0.11 −0.10 7 7
Sweden 0.54 −0.20 −0.20 13 14
Netherlands 0.44 −0.07 −0.07 4 5
Spain 0.56 −0.15 −0.15 10 10
Italy 0.42 −0.07 −0.07 5 4
France 0.50 −0.12 −0.12 8 8
Denmark 0.48 −0.16 −0.16 11 11
Greece 0.37 −0.21 −0.20 14 13
Switzerland 0.36 −0.08 −0.07 6 6
Belgium 0.44 −0.12 −0.12 9 9
Czech Rep. 0.55 −0.20 −0.19 12 12
Poland 0.66 −0.06 −0.05 2 2
Ireland 0.42 −0.02 −0.02 1 1
SAH 1 (poor)
Austria 0.07 −0.06 −0.02 2 2
Germany 0.11 −0.27 −0.10 11 12
Sweden 0.07 −0.33 −0.09 14 11
Netherlands 0.05 −0.30 −0.05 12 7
Spain 0.14 −0.16 −0.07 7 9
Italy 0.13 −0.10 −0.05 5 5
France 0.09 −0.19 −0.07 9 8
Denmark 0.06 −0.33 −0.08 13 10
Greece 0.06 −0.09 −0.02 3 3
Switzerland 0.03 0.02 0.00 1 1
Belgium 0.07 −0.10 −0.02 4 4
Czech Rep. 0.14 −0.25 −0.12 10 14
Poland 0.34 −0.12 −0.10 6 1366 G. Kjellsson, U.-G. Gerdtham / Journa
Erreygers (2009b, p. 523) points out this lack of convergence as
he major shortcoming of W,  because it means that W may  exag-
erate the measured degree of inequality when h is approaching
ts limits. However, we claim that W does not exaggerate the level
f inequalities for low values of h but measures relative rather
han absolute inequalities. Thus, if an index considers both relative
nequalities in health and relative inequalities in ill-health, the con-
ergence property proposed by Erreygers (2009b) is not necessarily
n appealing property.
. Empirical analysis
.1. Data
Empirically, we examine how the choice of index affects com-
arisons between countries using nine binary indicators of bad
ealth from the second wave of the European Survey of Health,
geing and Retirement (SHARE).17 The nine indicators are: having
iabetes, having cancer, being a daily smoker, having a long-term
llness, having more than two limitations in daily life, having more
han two chronic diseases, and three measures of bad self-assessed
ealth (SAH). The three SAH measures are from the same reported
rdinal scale, but are coded at different cut-off points.18 As the
ocioeconomic ranking variable, we use equivalent income on a
ousehold level.19
To examine whether the choice of index affects comparisons
etween countries, we compute correlation coefﬁcients of the
ndices. However, what really matters is whether the choice of
ndex affects the rank of the countries; for example, if health is
ore equally distributed in country A than in country B according
o W,  but the reverse pattern emerges according to E. Therefore, we
ompute Spearman’s and Kendall’s rank correlation coefﬁcients.
.2. Results
The indices in Table 2 and the rank correlation coefﬁcients in
able 3 show that the choice of index may  affect the ranking and
hus in turn affect the outcome of a comparison. The ranking of the
4 countries are different for E and W for all nine health indicators,
lbeit to differing extents.
W and E, as well as their deﬁnitions of the most unequal soci-
ty, coincide when 1−h = h = ½ and diverge for large and small
alues of 1−h (see Eqs. (4) and (5)). Because E is level indepen-
ent while W is not, the ranking based on the two indices will be
ifferent when h varies between contexts. The empirical ﬁndings
resented in Tables 2 and 3 conﬁrm these claims. For health vari-
bles in which 1−h is close to ½ for all countries (e.g. long-term
llness) the rankings based on the two indices practically coincide.
y contrast, if 1−h varies substantially across the countries (e.g.
AH 3), the rank correlation is low. Although the number of obser-
ations is small, we can also easily verify this twofold conclusion
y running a regression of the rank correlation coefﬁcients on the
ean of the prevalence ¯1−h, the squared mean of the prevalence¯ 21−h, and the standard deviations of the prevalence. The results in
able 4 ﬁrst show that there is a U-shaped association between the
ean of the prevalence ¯1−h and the rank correlation coefﬁcient;
17 The settings include Austria, Germany, Sweden, Netherlands, Spain, Italy,
rance, Denmark, Greece, Switzerland, Belgium, Czech Republic, Poland, and Ireland.
18 The ordinal scale is (1) excellent, (2) very good, (3) good, (4) fair, and (5) poor.
AH 1 is equal to one if the respondent has reported having poor health (5). SAH 2
orresponds to less than good health (4 or 5), and SAH 3 corresponds to less than
ery good health (3, 4, or 5).
19 Reported household income in the last month divided by the square root of the
ousehold size.
Ireland 0.07 −0.19 −0.05 8 6
SAH 2 (less than good)
Austria 0.31 −0.22 −0.19 8 7
Germany 0.41 −0.24 −0.23 10 13
Sweden 0.30 −0.27 −0.22 13 10
Netherlands 0.29 −0.15 −0.13 4 4
Spain 0.46 −0.20 −0.20 6 8
Italy 0.44 −0.11 −0.11 2 3
France 0.36 −0.23 −0.21 9 9
Denmark 0.25 −0.31 −0.23 14 12
Greece 0.30 −0.27 −0.23 12 11
Switzerland 0.18 −0.12 −0.07 3 1
Belgium 0.30 −0.22 −0.18 7 6
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Table  2 (Continued)
1−h W E Rank W Rank E
Czech Rep. 0.46 −0.26 −0.26 11 14
Poland 0.63 −0.10 −0.09 1 2
Ireland 0.25 −0.20 −0.15 5 5
SAH 3 (less than very good)
Austria 0.73 −0.19 −0.15 6 6
Germany 0.81 −0.24 −0.15 11 4
Sweden 0.59 −0.27 −0.26 12 13
Netherlands 0.72 −0.20 −0.16 7 8
Spain 0.87 −0.19 −0.09 4 3
Italy 0.81 −0.13 −0.08 1 2
France 0.79 −0.22 −0.15 9 5
Denmark 0.49 −0.28 −0.28 13 14
Greece 0.63 −0.24 −0.22 10 12
Switzerland 0.54 −0.18 −0.18 3 10
Belgium 0.71 −0.19 −0.16 5 7
Czech Rep. 0.82 −0.32 −0.18 14 11
Poland 0.93 −0.21 −0.06 8 1
Ireland 0.54 −0.16 −0.16 2 9
Limitations
Austria 0.08 −0.04 −0.01 2 2
Germany 0.06 −0.18 −0.04 6 6
Sweden 0.04 −0.38 −0.06 13 10
Netherlands 0.03 −0.28 −0.04 10 5
Spain 0.07 −0.28 −0.08 11 12
Italy 0.08 0.01 0.00 1 1
France 0.07 −0.21 −0.06 8 9
Denmark 0.06 −0.41 −0.09 14 14
Greece 0.06 −0.15 −0.04 4 4
Switzerland 0.02 −0.27 −0.02 9 3
Belgium 0.09 −0.17 −0.05 5 7
Czech Rep. 0.07 −0.30 −0.08 12 13
Poland 0.17 −0.10 −0.05 3 8
Ireland 0.09 −0.21 −0.07 7 11
Chronic disease
Austria 0.20 −0.05 −0.03 2 3
Germany 0.21 −0.15 −0.10 7 8
Sweden 0.21 −0.29 −0.20 13 13
Netherlands 0.14 −0.15 −0.07 9 5
Spain 0.23 −0.15 −0.11 8 9
Italy 0.27 −0.10 −0.08 5 6
France 0.18 −0.24 −0.14 11 10
Denmark 0.23 −0.32 −0.23 14 14
Greece 0.21 −0.28 −0.18 12 12
Switzerland 0.09 −0.09 −0.03 4 2
Belgium 0.22 −0.13 −0.09 6 7
Czech Rep. 0.25 −0.21 −0.16 10 11
Poland 0.31 −0.03 −0.03 1 1
Ireland 0.22 −0.09 −0.06 3 4
Smoking
Austria 0.14 0.06 0.03 5 5
Germany 0.18 0.00 0.00 8 8
Sweden 0.17 −0.04 −0.02 13 13
Netherlands 0.25 −0.12 −0.09 14 14
Spain 0.16 0.22 0.12 1 2
Italy 0.17 0.09 0.05 4 4
France 0.15 0.03 0.02 7 7
Denmark 0.28 −0.01 −0.01 10 10
Greece 0.29 0.16 0.13 2 1
Switzerland 0.18 −0.03 −0.02 12 12
Belgium 0.19 0.05 0.03 6 6
Czech Rep. 0.21 0.14 0.09 3 3
Poland 0.27 −0.02 −0.02 11 11
Ireland 0.19 0.00 0.00 9 9
t
d
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Table 3
Rank correlations coefﬁcients.
Health indicator Spearman Kendall Pearson SDa of 1−h ¯1−h
Cancer 0.947 0.824 0.940 0.017 0.039
Diabetes 0.824 0.692 0.959 0.025 0.110
Long-term illness 0.991 0.956 0.998 0.085 0.484
SAH 1 0.741 0.604 0.705 0.075 0.101
SAH 2 0.903 0.758 0.931 0.117 0.352
SAH 3 0.486 0.319 0.617 0.135 0.713
Limitation 0.741 0.582 0.742 0.034 0.070
Chronic disease 0.938 0.846 0.975 0.053 0.213
Smoking 0.996 0.978 0.982 0.049 0.202
a SD: standard deviation.
Table 4
Regression results.
SDa of ¯1−h ¯1−h ¯1−h
Spearman −3.06 2.40 −3.07
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of absolute inequality decreases as the level of health increases,
but only up to the point of h = 0.5. Second, W may  increase even
if absolute differences in health decrease and relative differenceshat is, the ranking according to W and the ranking according to E
iverge for low and high values of ¯1−h. Second, the results also
onﬁrm that the larger the variation in prevalence, the smaller the
ank correlation coefﬁcient. rKendall −4.50 3.28 −3.96
a SD: standard deviation.
. Conclusion
To appropriately measure inequalities of binary health variables
t is important to pay attention to both the normative and the tech-
ical aspects of an inequality index, but it is also important to keep
he two  aspects separate. Even though C, V, W,  and E all belong to
he family of rank-dependent indicators, they each correspond to
 different perspective on socioeconomic inequalities in health as
hey weight absolute inequalities differently. For binary variables,
, W,  and E all condition the level of absolute inequality on the
ost unequal society, but they differ in their deﬁnitions of that
tate. C answers the question of how far the society is from a state
here the richest individual is in possession of all health units in
he society (without considering the upper bound of the variable).
onversely, W and E acknowledge the boundedness of the health
ariable; W answers the question of how far the society is, given
ts overall level of health, from a state where only the individuals
t the top of the income distribution are healthy, while E answers
he question of how far the society is from a state where only the
pper 50% of the income distribution are healthy, independent of
revalence.
Overall, the preferred index depends on the desired value judg-
ent. If we are interested in absolute inequalities, E is the preferred
ndex. For a relative value judgment, however, the issue is blurred;
nless we  relax the mirror condition (i.e. we  have a priori rea-
ons to adopt the implicit value judgments of relative inequalities
easured in either health or ill-health), it is futile to discuss rela-
ive value judgments for bounded variables in the same way as for
nbounded health variables. Focusing on the deﬁnition of the most
nequal society, we  have illustrated how Wagstaff, by normaliz-
ng C, created an index that is neither relative nor absolute, but
 compromise between relative inequality in health and relative
nequality in ill-health.
For relative inequality in health, the importance of absolute
nequality decreases as the prevalence of health increases, while
or relative inequality in ill-health, the importance of absolute
nequality increases as the prevalence of health increases. Combin-
ng the two perspectives in the manner of W,  adding together the
evel of relative inequality in health and ill-health, causes a seem-
ngly counterintuitive behavior of the index. First, the importanceemain unchanged.
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One may, as do Erreygers and Van Ourti (2011a,b),  perceive this
nconsistency as undesirable. But if our initial intention was  to mea-
ure relative inequality, reverting to an absolute index because we
annot decide upon a relative perspective is not necessarily supe-
ior to using a mirror relative index. Conversely, if it is possible to
ormatively accept a compromise between the two  relative per-
pectives (i.e. accepting that the counterintuitive behavior of such
n index is a result of this compromise), then using a mirror rel-
tive index represents an ethically defensible position that is a
atisfactory alternative to using an absolute index.
Moreover, we acknowledge the compelling technical sim-
licity of E. Unlike W,  E satisﬁes linearity, convergence, and
onotonicity. All three properties make it easier to interpret
nd anticipate how health changes affect the index. Neverthe-
ess, they are a result of level independence and the particular
eﬁnition of the most unequal society. Thus, these properties
re only desirable if one wants to capture an absolute value
udgment.
Following our empirical results, we conclude that because com-
arisons between contexts are affected by the choice of index, the
iscussion of which index to use is important and not simply a
atter of semantics. Therefore, we call for researchers and practi-
ioners to consider their choice of index seriously and to reﬂect
ritically on which value judgment to impose when evaluating
ealth inequalities. For policy makers, these ﬁndings are impor-
ant because the results of different indices may  call for different
trategies.
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ppendix A.
.1. The most unequal society and the weight of absolute
nequalitiesWe can express W,  E, and C as ratios between V of the observed
tate and V of the state in which the inequalities are maximized
ccording to the deﬁnition of each respective index (Vmax I). Using
he deﬁnitions from Section 2, we let hi be a binary indicator of
(alth Economics 32 (2013) 659– 670
ood health and express V as:
= 2
n2
n∑
i=1
zihi =
2
n2
n∑
i=1
(
n + 1
2
− i
)
hi
=
n∑
i=1
hi
n
+
n∑
i=1
hi
n2
+
n∑
i=1
2ihi
n2
f, in accordance with W’s  deﬁnition of the most unequal society,
e let only the richest K individuals be in good health, where K =
n
i=1hi then
∑n
i=1ihi = K(K + 1)/2 and Vmax W equals:
max W = K
n
+ K
n2
− 2K(K + 1)
2n2
= K
n
(
1 − K
n
)
= h(1 − h)
hus, we can express W as:
 = 2
n2(1 − h)h
∑n
i=1
zihi =
1
(1 − h)h
V = V
Vmax W
f, in accordance with E’s deﬁnition of the most unequal society, we
et K = 0.5n (i.e. only the richest 50% of the individuals are in good
ealth), then Vmax E equals:
max E = K
n
(
1 − K
n
)
= 0.25
Thus, we can express E as:
 = 8
n2h
n∑
i=1
zihi =
1
0.25
V = V
Vmax E
or C, the most unequal society is deﬁned as a state where the
ichest individual possesses all health units in the society; that is,
i = nh for i such that i = 1 and hi = 0 for everyone else. Thus, Vmax C
quals:
max C = 2
n2
n∑
i=1
(
n + 1
2
−  i
)
hi
= 2
n2
(
n + 1
2
− 1
)
nh = h
(
1 − 1
n
)
.
or a large enough n, Vmax C tends to h and we  can express C as:
 = 2
n2h
n∑
i=1
zihi =
1
h
V = V
Vmax C
.2. Mirror relativity
eﬁnition. A rank dependent index I(h) is mirror relative if
(h) = B[C(h) − C(1 − h)]
here B is a positive constant (i.e. a mirror relative index sums
he level of relative inequality in health and the level of relative
nequality in ill-health into the same index).
roposition 1. A rank dependent index I(h) is mirror relative if and
nly if1) For an equiproportionate change in health from h* to ˇh*,
I(h*) changes by the same magnitude as a rank-dependent
index that is relative from the perspective of ill-health, i.e.
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∂I(ˇh∗)
∂ˇ
= −
∂
(
A
1−ˇh
∑n
i=1zi(1−ˇhi
∗)
)
∂ˇ
for all admissible ˇ, where A
is a positive constant.
2) The normalization function f is a strictly convex function in h and
symmetric around h = 0.5.
roof of Proposition 1. Let I(h) = f (h, n)
∑n
i=1zihi be a mirror
elative index, i.e. I(h) = B[C(h) −C(1 −h)], where B is a posi-
ive constant. Let A = (2B/n2), then I(h) = (A/h)
∑n
i=1zihi −
A/(1 − h)]
∑n
i=1zi(1 − hi) = [A/h(1 − h)]
∑n
i=1zihi. To evaluate
quiproportionate changes of health, we consider the ratio-scaled
rojection of h, i.e. h*. As ∂
(
(A/ˇh)
∑n
i=1zi(ˇhi
∗)
)
/∂  ˇ = 0 it fol-
ows that ∂I(ˇh
∗)
∂ˇ
=
∂
(
A
ˇh
∑n
i=1zi(ˇhi
∗)− A
(1−ˇh)
∑n
i=1zi(1−ˇhi
∗)
)
∂ˇ
=
∂
(
A
(1−ˇh)
∑n
i=1zi(1−ˇhi
∗)
)
∂ˇ
. That is (1) holds. As
f (h)=A/h(1 − h) = f (1 − h),
∂f (h)/∂h=A(2h − 1)/[h(1 − h)]2
{= 0 for h = 0
> 0 for h > 0.5
< 0 for h < 0.5
, and
f 2(h)/∂2h = −2A(1 − 3h + 32h)/[h(h − 1)]
3 = (2A/3
h
) −
2A/(h − 1)3) > 0 for 0 < h < 1, the normalization function f is
 strictly convex function symmetric around h = 0.5. That is, (2)
olds. Thus, if I(h) is a mirror relative index, (1) and (2) hold.
Let (1) ∂I(ˇh∗)/∂  ˇ = −∂
(
[A/(1 − ˇh)]
∑n
i=1zi(1 − ˇhi
∗)
)
/∂ˇ
or all admissible  ˇ and let (2) the normalization func-
ion f be a strictly convex function symmetric around
.5. Since
∑n
i=1zi(1 − ˇhi
∗) = −ˇ
∑n
i=1zihi
∗, (1) implies that
ˇf (ˇh)/∂  ˇ = A/(ˇh − 1)2. To ﬁnd f(h), take the anti-
erivative of ∂ˇf(ˇh)/∂ˇ:
f (ˇh) =
∫
∂ˇf (ˇh)
∂ˇ
dˇ=
∫
A
(ˇh − 1)2
dˇ= A
h(1 − hˇ)
+ K,
here K is a constant. Let K = ˇg(ˇh), where g(h) is a function of
h, then
f (ˇh) =
ˇA
ˇh(1 − ˇh)
+ ˇg(ˇh).
 is a constant (i.e. not a function of ˇ) if and only if g(h) = D/h,
here D is an arbitrary constant, i.e. g(h) is either equal
o zero or a function of h that is homogenous of degree
1. Thus f (h) = A/h(1 − h) + D/h. Let D /= 0, then
(h) = D/h /= D/(1 − h) = g(1 − h) and f (h) = A/h(1 −
h) + g(h) /= A/h(1 − h) + g(1 − h) = f (1 − h), which is a
ontradiction as it violates (2). Thus, if (1) and (2) hold, D = 0,
 (h) = A/h(1 − h), and I(h) = f (h)
∑n
i=1zihi = [A/h + A/(1 −
h)]
∑n
i=1zihi = (A/h)
∑n
i=1zihi − [A/(1 − h)]
∑n
i=1zi(1 − hi), i.e.
(h) is mirror relative.
roposition 2. A rank dependent index I(h) is mirror relative if and
nly if:
(h)=
∂f (h, n)
∂h
h
f (h, n)
= − 1 + h
1 − h
= εC(h)(h) + C(1−h)(h)
hat is, the elasticity of the normalization function equals the sum of
he elasticities, with respect to h, of the normalization functions for
(h) and C(1  − h). ∑
roof of Proposition 2. Let I(h) = f (h, n) ni=1zihi be a mirror
elative index, i.e. I(h) = B[C(h) − C(1 − h)], where B is a pos-
tive constant. Let A = 2B/n2, then I(h) = (A/h)
∑n
i=1zihi −
A/(1 − h)]
∑n
i=1zi(1 − hi) = [A/h(1 − h)]
∑n
i=1zihi. Then,
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(h) = (∂f (h, n)/∂h)(h/f (h, n)) = (2h − 1)/(1 − h) =
1 + h/(1 − h). Solving the differential equation ε(h) =
∂f (h, n)/∂h][h/f (h, n)] = −1 + h/(1 − h) shows that
 (h) = A/h(1 − h) is the single solution. Thus, I(h) is mirror
elative if and only if ε(h) = −1 + h/(1 − h).
.3. Individual health changes
Let N represent a given population. Consider a health change
f m individuals represented by the set M ⊆ N. If these individuals
nter a state of good health, then E changes as
E  = 1
Vmax E
V  = 8
n2
∑
j  ∈ M
zjhj
Thus, E  depends only on the socioeconomic rank of the
dditional individual’s changing health state and E satisﬁes mono-
onicity. As W does not satisfy level independence the increased
revalence affects the most unequal society and the change in W
quals
W = 1
Vmax W1
V  + 
(
1
Vmax W
)
V
= 1
[1 − (h + (m/n))(h + (m/n))]
2
n2
∑
j ∈ M
zjhj
+
[
1
h − 2h + (m/n)
(
1 − 2h − (m/n)
) − 1
h − 2h
]
2
n2
∑
i ∈ N−M
zihi
The ﬁrst part equals the change in actual inequalities induced by
he additional m individuals entering a state of good health (i.e. V)
eighted by the most unequal society with the new prevalence
h + (m/n)) (i.e. Vmax W1 ). This part, like E, is always monotonic.
he sign and size of the second part depend on both the initial abso-
ute inequalities (i.e. V) and the change in the weight ((1/Vmax W ))
nduced by the increased prevalence. The sign of (1/Vmax W ) is
egative if h < (n − m)/2n and positive if h > (n − m)/2n. As
his second part may  be of the opposite sign and exceed the ﬁrst,
 is not monotonic.
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